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Abstract 
Social reality can be created through self-fulfilling prophecies and perceptual biases.  A self-
fulfilling prophecy is a false belief that leads to its own fulfillment.  A perceptual bias occurs when 
an individual believes that her or his inaccurate expectation about another has been confirmed to a 
greater extent than it has in reality.  Although research findings bearing on these processes are 
robust, these effects are typically small.  Nonetheless, this does not mean that self-fulfilling 
prophecy and perceptual bias effects are always small.  There are conditions under which such 
effects have the potential to be powerful.  The current experiment tested this possibility by 
addressing two main goals: 1) to examine if expectancy effects accumulate across perceivers and 2) 
to examine whether unfavorable or favorable expectancies produce more powerful cumulative 
expectancy effects.  Sessions were run with groups of two perceivers and one target (N=145 groups).  
Whereas some perceivers were induced with either an unfavorable (i.e., hostile) or a favorable (i.e., 
friendly) expectancy, other perceivers were not induced with any expectancy.  All perceivers then 
interacted with a target in a reaction time task, during which they used a noise weapon on an 
alternating basis.  After the reaction time task, participants’ impressions of each other were 
measured.  The average noise level that targets administered to perceivers was the dependent 
variable used to test for self-fulfilling prophecy effects.  Perceivers’ impressions of targets was the 
dependent variable used to test for perceptual bias effects.  Results failed to support the occurrence 
of a self-fulfilling prophecy.  However, perceptual bias effects were observed – perceivers induced 
with an unfavorable expectancy judged targets’ as significantly more hostile than perceivers who 
were not induced with an unfavorable expectancy.  However, further analyses indicated that 
perceptual bias effects did not accumulate across perceivers.  Possible implications and some 
limitations of the experiment are discussed.
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Chapter I: Expectancy Effect Processes 
 Social psychological theory proposes that people’s expectancies can construct social reality 
(Klein & Snyder, 2003; Miller & Turnbull, 1986; Snyder & Stukas, 1999).  Interest in the role of 
expectancies can be traced back to the scholar Samuel Johnson.  Johnson (1905) posited that people 
love to expect and once these expectations are either satiated or disappointed, individuals continue 
with new expectations.  The role of expectancies has been central to social psychological research.  
New Look in Perception research of the 1940s and 1950s posited that people’s interpretation of 
reality is biased by their emotions, motives, and expectations (Bruner, 1957; Merton, 1948).  The 
self-fulfilling prophecy and perceptual bias processes are central to this theoretical tradition because 
they involve people’s expectancies shaping actual behavior and altering perceptions.  
The Self-fulfilling Prophecy 
 Robert Merton introduced the term self-fulfilling prophecy to the social sciences to refer to 
false beliefs that lead to their own fulfillment (Merton, 1948).  Drawing on Merton’s work, 
researchers have identified three core, sequential events that must occur for a self-fulfilling prophecy 
to take place.  First, one person (a perceiver) must hold a false expectancy about another person (a 
target).  For example, a teacher, drawing on social class stereotypes, might overestimate a student’s 
intelligence on the basis of the student’s socioeconomic background.  Second, the perceiver must 
treat the target in a manner consistent with the false expectancy.  The teacher who overestimates the 
student’s intelligence would have to treat that student as if she or he is more intelligent than is 
actually the case.  Third, the target has to respond to the perceiver’s treatment in such a way as to 
confirm the originally false expectancy, thus making it come true.  The student who is treated as if 
she or he is especially intelligent would have to learn more than other students in the class, thereby 
confirming the teacher’s originally false expectancy.  
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Perceptual Biases 
 In contrast to a self-fulfilling prophecy which involves perceivers changing targets’ actual 
behavior, a perceptual bias occurs when perceivers’ expectancies influence their perceptions of 
targets’ behavior.  That is, a perceptual bias occurs when a perceiver believes that her or his false 
expectancy has been confirmed to a greater degree than it has in reality (Neuberg, 1989).  For 
example, a coach might believe that a particular athlete will perform statistically well during the 
season.  Consistent with this false expectancy, the coach may interpret and remember the athlete’s 
performance as above average, even though the athlete’s performance did not differ from the 
performance of other team members.  Consistent with a perceptual bias, therefore, the coach 
believed that the athlete confirmed the false expectancy to a greater extent than was actually the 
case.  Perceptual biases reflect perceivers’ attempts to assimilate new information into their existing 
beliefs (Jussim, Eccles, & Madon, 1996). 
Expectancy Effects: Empirical Support 
Much of the initial interest in expectancy effects arose out of Rosenthal’s early work on 
experimenter biases.  Rosenthal’s interest in experimenter biases began with his dissertation 
research.  While collecting his dissertation data, it occurred to him that he may have been treating his 
participants in ways that were causing them to confirm his hypotheses, a process that he later labeled 
unconscious experimenter bias.  This realization led Rosenthal to study the effects of unconscious 
experimenter bias effects in the lab.  Through this research he was able to show that he could 
produce the effect reliably, which led him to question how many other experimenters were attaining 
results that reflected this bias.  Rosenthal’s findings were important because they suggested that the 
results reported in scientific journals may be invalid by virtue of having been biased by 
experimenters’ hypotheses.  That suggestion alarmed researchers and ultimately led to the 
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widespread use of procedures designed to reduce experimenter biases such as blind and double-blind 
procedures (Rosenthal, 2002).  
Rosenthal’s findings on experimenter biases were also important because they raised the 
possibility that the influence of expectancies on behavior might generalize beyond subjects’ behavior 
in the lab to other contexts.  That possibility sparked hundreds of studies designed to examine the 
influence of expectancies on behavior and perceptions.  The largest and most recognized group of 
studies within this literature focused on teacher expectancy effects.  One of the classic studies from 
this literature is the Pygmalion study (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968).  The Pygmalion study illustrates 
how expectancies can result in both self-fulfilling prophecies and perceptual biases. 
In this study, elementary school teachers were led to believe that Harvard researchers had 
administered a new IQ test to students that could identify intellectual blooming.  The researchers 
then informed teachers which of their students had been identified by this test as one of these 
bloomers – students who would have substantial gains in their IQs over the course of the academic 
year.  In reality, however, there was no special test to measure intellectual blooming.  Students had 
simply been administered a typical IQ test, and random assignment determined which students 
would be labeled as the bloomers and which would not, with the latter group of students serving as 
controls.   
Because the students had been randomly assigned to these conditions, there was no real 
difference in their likelihood of having large IQ gains.  The only difference between the bloomers 
and control students was their teachers’ expectancies about them.  Accordingly, any difference 
between their IQs at the end of the school year could only be due to their teachers’ self-fulfilling 
effects, which is exactly what the study showed.  Students who were labeled as bloomers had 
significantly greater gains in their IQs compared with control students.  Furthermore, consistent with 
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a perceptual bias, teachers described the students who had been labeled as bloomers more favorably 
than they described the control students.  They perceived the bloomers to be more interesting, 
curious, appealing, autonomous, and better adjusted.  These general patterns, showing self-fulfilling 
prophecy and perceptual bias effects, have been replicated in a variety of settings and with varied 
expectancies and outcomes (see Rosenthal, 2002; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978; Snyder & Stukas, 1999, 
for reviews).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
Chapter II: The Power of Expectancy Effects 
 It is well-established that perceivers’ false expectancies can shape both targets’ behavior 
through self-fulfilling prophecies and bias perceivers’ impressions of targets’ behavior through 
perceptual biases.  Although these effects have traditionally been characterized as powerful (Darley 
& Fazio, 1980; E.E. Jones, 1986; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Merton, 1948; Miller & Turnbull, 1986; 
Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968; Snyder, 1984), empirical research has not supported this claim 
(Jussim, 1991; Jussim & Eccles, 1992; Jussim, Eccles & Madon, 1996; Madon, Jussim & Eccles, 
1997).  Naturalistic and experimental research provide convergent evidence that expectancy effects 
tend to be modest in magnitude, with effects sizes ranging from .1 to .3 in terms of standardized 
correlation coefficients (Jussim, 1991).  
 The magnitude of these effects suggests that expectancies do not typically bring about large 
changes in targets’ behaviors or in perceivers’ impressions of targets’ behavior.  However, these 
reported effect sizes are averages that do not take into consideration the possibility that a variety of 
factors and processes may render expectancy effects more powerful.  The following sections discuss 
different factors and processes that have been shown to influence the power of self-fulfilling 
prophecy and perceptual bias effects.  
Target Characteristics 
One general factor that has been shown to influence expectancy effects is target 
characteristics.  Target characteristics refer to targets’ personal attributes such as their personality 
traits, self-views, social groups, and physical appearance.  Research addressing target characteristics 
has focused exclusively on the self-fulfilling prophecy process with a particular emphasis on the 
moderating effects of targets’ self-concepts and social group membership.  This research has shown 
that self-fulfilling prophecy effects are more powerful among targets with unclear self-concepts.  For 
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example, Swann and Ely (1984) showed that when targets held unclear self-concepts they confirmed 
perceivers’ false expectancies more than targets who held clear self-concepts.  This pattern was 
strongest when perceivers were certain about the validity of their expectancies.   
Self-fulfilling prophecy effects are also more powerful among targets who belong to 
stigmatized social groups.  For example, Jussim and colleagues (Jussim et al., 1996; Madon et al., 
1997; Smith, Jussim, Eccles, VanNoy, Madon, Palumbo, 1998) showed that, within the context of 
the classroom, self-fulfilling prophecy effects were stronger among minorities, students from lower 
social class backgrounds, students with histories of poor academic performance, students who were 
tracked into low ability groups within classes, and students with multiple vulnerabilities (e.g., lower 
social class students with histories of poor academic performance).  In fact, the magnitude of some 
of these relations represent the most powerful self-fulfilling prophecy effects ever observed in 
naturalistic research with effect sizes reaching as high as .63 in terms of standardized regression 
coefficients.  The above findings provide evidence that the way targets view themselves and the 
social groups to which they belong can increase their susceptibility to confirming perceivers’ false 
expectancies about them.   
Although there currently does not exist any empirical research addressing whether target 
characteristics also influence the power of perceptual bias effects, such a possibility seems likely.  
Targets with unclear self-concepts may be less likely than targets with clear self-concepts to engage 
in self-verification processes when interacting with perceivers.  If targets with unclear self-concepts 
refrain from exhibiting behaviors that directly disconfirm the false expectancies that perceivers hold 
about them, then perceivers may assume that their expectancies have been confirmed, even in cases 
where they have not been.  Targets’ membership in stigmatized social groups may also produce 
relatively powerful perceptual bias effects.  Perceivers may be more likely to believe that their false 
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expectancies have been confirmed when those beliefs are derived from social stereotypes, in part, 
because social stereotypes tend to be consensually shared with a given culture (Willard, 2006).  
Situational and Motivational Factors 
Situational and motivational factors can also influence the power of expectancy effects.  
Situational factors are environmental variables such as power status differentials, time constraints, 
and the presence of others.  Situational factors often interact with individuals’ behavior and make the 
occurrence of expectancy effects more likely and more pronounced compared to contexts in which 
these situational factors are not present.  For example, research has shown that expectancy effects 
are stronger when perceivers interact longer with targets, when perceivers have a higher status than 
targets, and when perceivers are aware of their social power relative to targets (Copeland, 1994; 
Harris, Lightner, & Manolis, 1998; Snyder, 1992; Snyder & Haugen, 1994, 1995; Swann & Ely, 
1984).   
Motivational factors are the goals and motives that drive people’s behavior.  Motivational 
factors are internal to an individual, but can be influenced by situational factors.  For example, a 
person may be more highly motivated to arrive at an accurate impression of another person if the 
two people’s outcomes are dependent because of situational constraints (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Rudman, 1998).  Research examining the moderating influence of motivational factors on 
expectancy effects has shown that such effects are stronger when perceivers are motivated to 
establish a stable impression of a target (Snyder, 1992; Snyder & Haugen, 1994, 1995), when 
perceivers more strongly believe in the validity of their expectancies (Swann & Ely, 1984), and 
when perceivers are motivated to confirm their false expectancies because of an incentive (Cooper & 
Hazelrigg, 1988).  Expectancy effects are less likely to happen, in contrast, when perceivers are 
motivated to befriend targets (Neuberg, Judice, Virdin, & Carrillo, 1993; Snyder & Copeland, 1990), 
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perceivers are motivated to either have smooth interactions with targets (Snyder & Haugen, 1994) or 
to form accurate impressions of targets (Neuberg, 1989), when an interaction involves perceivers 
disclosing information about themselves to targets (Mobilio & Snyder, 1996), and when targets are 
motivated to find out information about perceivers (Snyder & Haugen, 1995). 
Expectancy Valence 
 A third factor that can influence the power of expectancy effects is the favorableness of the 
false expectancy.  Favorable false expectancies are ones in which perceivers view targets more 
positively than is warranted.  Unfavorable false expectancies, in contrast, are ones in which 
perceivers view targets more negatively than is warranted.  Research investigating the differential 
effects of favorable and unfavorable expectancies has tended to focus on self-fulfilling prophecy 
effects and has typically emphasized the greater power of unfavorable expectancies to shape 
behavior.  For example, self-fulfilling prophecies have historically been linked to social problems by 
virtue of their tendency to contribute to (rather than to ameliorate) social inequalities (Klein & 
Snyder, 2003); to undermine (rather than to enhance) the academic achievement of minority students 
(Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968); and to fuel (rather than to reduce) discrimination and discriminatory 
policies (Merton, 1948).  Although such perspectives suggest that self-fulfilling prophecies harm 
targets more than they help them, few empirical studies have tested this hypothesis and the few that 
have yielded mixed results (for reviews, see Jussim, Palumbo, Chatman, Madon, & Smith, 2000; 
Snyder & Stukas, 1999).   
 For example, consistent with the idea that unfavorable expectancies produced stronger self-
fulfilling prophecy effects than favorable ones, Alvidrez and Weinstein (1999) showed that teachers’ 
expectancies predicted students’ subsequent GPAs more strongly when teachers underestimated 
students’ intelligence than when they overestimated students’ intelligence (see also Babad et al., 
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1982; Sutherland & Goldschmid, 1974).  However, other research has shown the opposite pattern – 
that favorable expectancies produced more powerful self-fulfilling prophecy effects than unfavorable 
ones.  For example, Madon and colleagues (1997) showed that teachers’ expectancies predicted 
students’ standardized math test scores more strongly when they overestimated students’ math 
performance than when they underestimated students’ math performance (also see Madon, Guyll, 
Spoth, Cross, & Hilbert, 2003; Madon, Guyll, Spoth, & Willard, 2004).  These mixed findings 
highlight the need for additional research to investigate the differential self-fulfilling effects of 
favorable versus unfavorable expectancies.  
 There are no specific empirical investigations that address whether favorable or unfavorable 
expectancies are more likely to produce perceptual biases.  However, social psychological research 
suggests that individuals tend to be more influenced by negative information compared to positive 
information (for review, see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001).  People attend 
more to negative information than to positive information (Abele, 1985; Graziano, Brothern & 
Berscheid, 1980), regard negative information as more useful than positive information (Kanouse & 
Hanson, 1971), and weigh costs more heavily than rewards when making important decisions 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).  These findings suggest that perceivers may be more likely to believe 
that their false expectancies have been confirmed when those expectancies are unfavorable versus 
favorable. 
Accumulation of Expectancy Effects 
Another way that expectancy effects can become powerful is if they accumulate.  
Accumulation occurs when the expectancy effects elicited by multiple false expectancies combine to 
create a greater total expectancy effect than would have occurred had only one false expectancy 
elicited the effect (Jussim, Eccles, Madon, 1996; Madon et al., 2004).  The social psychological 
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literature has long speculated that the accumulation of expectancy effects can generate and 
perpetuate social inequalities (see Jussim et al., 1996; Klein & Snyder, 2003; Snyder, 1992; Snyder 
& Stukas, 1999, for reviews).  According to this perspective, the accumulation of expectancy effects 
puts targets on trajectories that serve to benefit some while harming others, thereby widening the gap 
between advantaged and disadvantaged individuals and groups (see Klein & Snyder, 2003; Jussim et 
al., 1996; Snyder & Stukas, 1999, for reviews; see Steele, 1997 for a related process).  The literature 
has identified two general classes of accumulation – accumulation that occurs over time and 
accumulation that occurs across perceivers.  The following sections discuss these two classes of 
accumulation in greater detail and review the relevant literature.  
Accumulation over time.  The accumulation of expectancy effects over time is a process 
whereby the magnitude of an individual perceiver’s expectancy effect becomes increasingly stronger 
as time passes.  The literature addressing the accumulation of expectancy effects over time includes 
four empirical studies, all of which focused exclusively on the self-fulfilling prophecy process.  Each 
of these studies examined the accumulation of self-fulfilling prophecy effects over time in the 
naturalistic environment.  Three focused on the cumulative self-fulfilling effects of teachers’ 
expectations on their students’ achievement over time (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968; Smith, Jussim 
& Eccles, 1999; West & Anderson, 1976) and one focused on the cumulative self-fulfilling effects of 
mothers’ beliefs on their children’s alcohol use over time (Madon, Willard, Guyll, Trudeau, Spoth, 
2006).  The findings of these studies were somewhat mixed in that some found evidence of 
accumulation (Madon et al., 2006; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968) whereas others did not (Smith et al., 
1999; West & Anderson, 1976).  However, one clear pattern did emerge from these studies: Self-
fulfilling prophecy effects only accumulated when perceivers and targets interacted regularly.  For 
example, Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) found that teachers’ self-fulfilling effects on students’ IQ 
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accumulated within a single school year during which time teachers and students interacted on a 
daily basis.  By contrast, self-fulfilling prophecy effects never accumulated when perceivers and 
targets did not interact regularly.  For example, Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) found that the 
tendency for teachers’ self-fulfilling effects to accumulate over time ceased after students switched 
teachers to advance to the next grade level.  
 No research has tested whether perceptual biases accumulate over time.  However, people 
routinely engage in a variety of information processing biases that could potentially produce 
cumulative perceptual bias effects.  For example, people have a tendency to attend to information 
that confirms their expectancies more than to information that disconfirms their expectancies and to 
have better memory for expectancy consistent information (Snyder, Campbell, & Preston, 1982; 
Snyder & White, 1981; Zuckerman, Knee, Hodgins, & Miyake, 1995).  Through biases such as 
these, people may become increasingly confident in the validity of their initial expectancies over 
time, thus leading to the accumulation of perceptual bias effects over time.  
Accumulation across perceivers.  The accumulation of expectancy effects across perceivers 
is a process whereby the expectancy effects elicited by multiple perceivers’ false expectancies is 
larger in combination than the expectancy effect elicited by each perceiver’s expectancy alone 
(Jussim, Eccles, Madon, 1996; Madon et al., 2004).  The literature examining the accumulation of 
expectancy effects across perceivers includes two empirical studies.  One study examined the 
accumulation of self-fulfilling prophecy effects across perceivers, whereas the other examined the 
accumulation of perceptual bias effects across perceivers.  
The study that examined the accumulation of self-fulfilling prophecy effects across 
perceivers did so in the context of the family, examining whether mothers’ and fathers’ expectancies 
had cumulative self-fulfilling effects on their children’s subsequent alcohol use.  Participating 
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families answered questionnaire items that assessed parents’ expectancies about their children’s 
alcohol use, children’s actual alcohol use, plus a variety of background predictors of adolescent 
alcohol use (e.g., self-assessed likelihood of drinking, social class, perception of friends’ alcohol use, 
etc.).  Twelve months later children’s alcohol use was re-assessed.  
As is typical of correlational studies on self-fulfilling prophecies, this study operationalized 
self-fulfilling prophecies as the unique relation between parents’ expectancies and children’s 
subsequent alcohol use after controlling for the background predictors of adolescent alcohol use.  
The results of this study supported the hypothesis that self-fulfilling prophecy effects accumulated 
across parents, but only when mothers’ and fathers’ expectancies were unfavorable.  Parents elicited 
the greatest degree of confirmatory behavior from their children when both mothers and fathers 
overestimated their children’s risk for alcohol use.  Self-fulfilling prophecy effects were not found to 
accumulate across mothers and fathers when they both underestimated their children’s risk for 
alcohol use.   
The findings of Madon et al. (2004) are important because they provide the first empirical 
evidence that the self-fulfilling effects of different perceivers can accumulate, thereby supporting 
years of theoretical speculation regarding this possibility (E.E. Jones, 1986; Merton, 1948).  They 
are also important because they suggest that there is an asymmetry in the accumulation of self-
fulfilling prophecy effects with the effects caused by unfavorable expectancies accumulating across 
perceivers to a greater extent than the effects caused by favorable expectancies.  
 However, because this study used correlational data, it also suffers from an important 
limitation.  Correlational studies do not provide as strong a basis for causal inference as do 
experiments.  With a correlational design one cannot determine whether the predictor variable(s) 
caused changes in the dependent variable, the dependent variable caused changes in the predictor 
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variable(s), or a third variable caused changes in both the predictor and dependent variables.  
Although longitudinal designs, such as the one used by Madon et al. (2004), do rule out reverse 
causal relations between the predictor and dependent variables, they do not rule out the possibility 
that a third, unmeasured variable was responsible for changes in both the predictor and dependent 
variables.  The potential omission of an unmeasured variable represents an accuracy explanation 
for relations between perceivers’ expectancies and targets’ subsequent behaviors.  With respect to 
Madon et al.’s findings, for example, the potential omission of an unmeasured variable raises the 
possibility that parents’ expectancies were most accurate when both mothers and fathers 
overestimated their children’s risk for alcohol use.  Although Madon et al. (2004) made a strong 
argument against an accuracy interpretation of their findings, the only way to definitively rule out 
such an explanation is to perform an experiment in which perceivers’ expectancies are 
manipulated.  There does not currently exist any experimental evidence that self-fulfilling 
prophecy effects accumulate across perceivers, thereby highlighting the need for an experimental 
replication of Madon et al.’s (2004) findings.  
Madon et al.’s (2004) research focused on synergistic accumulation.  Synergistic 
accumulation is a multiplicative process whereby the self-fulfilling effect of one perceiver’s 
expectancy is rendered more powerful when another perceiver’s expectancy is similar in terms of its 
favorableness (e.g., also unfavorable).  A second, distinct kind of cumulative self-fulfilling prophecy 
effect that has been discussed in the literature is concurrent accumulation.  Concurrent accumulation 
is an additive process whereby the total self-fulfilling effect of two or more perceivers is larger in 
combination than each is by itself.  For example, two teachers each of whom hold a false and 
unfavorable expectancy about a student would, according to the process of concurrent accumulation, 
elicit a greater degree of confirmatory behavior from the student in combination than would either 
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teacher individually.  There currently does not exist any research showing that self-fulfilling 
prophecy effects accumulate concurrently, making this an important process for future research to 
study. 
The literature also includes one study that examined the accumulation of perceptual bias 
effects across perceivers.  Willard (2006) examined this process in the context of an experiment in 
which perceivers’ expectancies about a target’s hostility were experimentally manipulated.  In this 
study, participants were assigned to three-person groups in which two participants played the role of 
perceivers and one played the role of the target.  Each three-person group was randomly assigned to 
one of three expectancy conditions: (1) a double unfavorable expectancy condition in which both 
perceivers were led to believe that the target was hostile; (2) a single unfavorable expectancy 
condition in which one perceiver was led to believe that the target was hostile whereas the other 
perceiver was not; and (3) a no expectancy condition in which neither perceiver was led to believe 
that the target was hostile.  Following the induction of the expectancy, perceivers engaged in a 
discussion task with the target.  Following the discussion task, perceivers judged the target’s 
hostility, which constituted the primary dependent variable.  
Analyses showed that perceivers judged the target as significantly more hostile when both 
perceivers were induced with an unfavorable expectancy than when only one was or neither were.  
This finding demonstrated that perceptual biases did in fact accumulate across perceivers.  
Additional analyses revealed that the obtained pattern of means supported concurrent, but not 
synergistic, accumulation effects.  These findings held true even though the target’s reported level of 
hostility before the interaction, and their actual level of hostility exhibited during the interaction (as 
coded by blind observers), were controlled for in the analyses.   
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Willard’s (2006) findings are important because they speak to the general power of 
expectancies to bias perceptions.  As noted previously, perceptual bias effects are usually modest.  
However, those effects reflect the biases of individual perceivers and, therefore, do not account for 
the possibility that perceptual bias effects may be strengthened when multiple perceivers each hold 
similar expectancies about a given target.  Accordingly, Willard’s findings suggest that expectancies 
may have stronger than average effects on perceptions in social situations involving multiple 
perceivers.  
Willard’s (2006) findings also raise an important question about the role of an expectancy’s 
favorableness in the accumulation of perceptual bias effects.  Willard focused exclusively on 
expectancies regarding hostility, which is generally considered an unfavorable personality 
characteristic.  Such a focus makes sense in light of the fact that unfavorable expectancies have been 
implicated in the creation and perpetuation of social problems more so than favorable expectancies 
(Klein & Snyder, 2003; Merton, 1948) and because the only other study examining the accumulation 
of expectancy effects found that unfavorable expectancies had cumulative self-fulfilling effects 
whereas favorable expectancies did not.  However, because Willard did not manipulate the 
favorableness of perceivers’ expectancies, it is not currently known whether unfavorable or 
favorable expectancies are more likely to produce cumulative perceptual bias effects.  
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Chapter III: Conceptual Overview and Hypotheses 
Conceptual Overview  
The current experiment was designed to address two main goals: 1) to examine if expectancy 
effects can become more powerful by accumulating across perceivers and 2) to examine whether 
favorable or unfavorable expectancies produce more powerful cumulative expectancy effects.  These 
goals were addressed with respect to both concurrent and synergistic accumulation.  The procedures 
that were used were adapted from a procedure developed by Snyder and Swann (1978).   
In Snyder and Swann’s (1978) study, participants were paired to create dyads in which one 
participant was assigned the role of the perceiver and the other was assigned the role of the target.  
Perceivers were given a fictitious description of the target that served to manipulate their 
expectancies about the targets’ hostility.  Half of the perceivers received a description that led them 
to believe that the target was hostile: “loved contact sports” and that he was “insensitive”, “self-
assertive”, “competitive”, “aggressive”, and “cruel”.  The other half received a description that led 
them to believe that the target was friendly: “enjoyed poetry and sailing” and that he was 
“submissive”, “sensitive”, “passive”, “kind”, and “cooperative” (p. 153).  
Following the induction of the expectancy, dyads competed in a reaction time task.  The 
reaction time task consisted of eight blocks with three trials per block.  Thus, there were 24 total 
trials.  During these trials, perceivers and targets were given a noise weapon to use strategically 
against their opponent.  The noise weapon was an electronic device that administered an aversive 
noise through headphones.  Participants selected the intensity of the noise that was to be 
administered to their opponent at the start of each block.  The perceiver and target alternated using 
the noise weapon, with the perceiver always using the noise weapon first in this alternating 
sequence.  
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Snyder and Swann (1978) predicted that perceivers induced with a hostile expectancy would 
administer a higher noise level to their opponent than perceivers induced with a non-hostile 
expectancy.  It was also predicted that targets would respond to this treatment in an expectancy 
consistent way.  That is, targets were predicted to select higher noise levels to administer back to 
perceivers when perceivers expected them to be hostile than when they did not.  Consistent with 
their predictions, results showed that perceivers who were induced with a hostile expectancy 
administered higher noise levels across the reaction time trials than did perceivers who were induced 
with a friendly expectancy.  Furthermore, consistent with a self-fulfilling prophecy, targets who were 
expected to be hostile by perceivers administered higher noise levels back to perceivers than did 
targets who were not expected to be hostile.  
Experiment Overview 
For the current experiment, Snyder and Swann’s (1978) procedure was modified in two key 
respects so as to address the goals of the research.  First, I included multiple perceivers, rather than 
only one.  Participants were grouped into triads in which two participants were randomly assigned to 
play the role of a perceiver and one was randomly assigned to play the role of a target.  This 
modification enabled me to test whether self-fulfilling prophecy and perceptual bias effects 
accumulated across perceivers.  Second, I modified the expectancies that Snyder and Swann used so 
that it was either unfavorable (hostile) or favorable (friendly) and also added a no expectancy 
condition.  This resulted in three expectancy conditions (unfavorable, favorable, and no expectancy) 
that enabled me to test whether the favorableness of perceivers’ expectancies moderated the power 
of cumulative self-fulfilling prophecy and perceptual bias effects.  I tested these processes with two 
dependent variables.  I used the average noise level selected by the target as the dependent variable 
to test for processes relevant to self-fulfilling prophecies and I used perceivers’ impressions of the 
18 
target’s hostility (which were assessed after the reaction time task) to test for processes relevant to 
perceptual biases. 
Hypotheses 
 The proposed research was designed to test six hypotheses – three pertaining to self-fulfilling 
prophecies and three pertaining to perceptual biases.  
Self-fulfilling prophecies: Concurrent accumulation hypothesis.  According to the concurrent 
accumulation hypothesis, the noise level administered by targets was hypothesized to be a) higher 
(unfavorable expectancies) or lower (favorable expectancies) in the double versus the single 
expectancy conditions, and b) higher (unfavorable expectancy) or lower (favorable expectancy) in 
the single versus no expectancy conditions (Figure 1).   
Self-fulfilling prophecies: Synergistic accumulation hypothesis.  According to the synergistic 
accumulation hypothesis, the difference between the noise level administered by targets in the single 
versus double expectancy conditions was expected to be larger than the difference between the noise 
level administered by targets in the no versus single expectancy conditions.  That is, the noise level 
administered by targets was predicted to become increasingly higher as the number of perceivers 
induced with an unfavorable expectancy increased from 0 to 1 to 2 and was expected to become 
increasingly lower as the number of perceivers induced with a favorable expectancy increased from 
0 to 1 to 2 (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2.  Predicted pattern showing synergistic accumulation of 
self-fulfilling prophecies across expectancies. 
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Figure 1.  Predicted pattern showing concurrent accumulation of 
self-fulfilling prophecies across expectancies. 
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Self-fulfilling prophecies: Expectancy favorableness as a moderator of cumulative self-
fulfilling effects.  According to the hypothesis that unfavorable expectancies have stronger 
cumulative self-fulfilling effects than favorable ones, the difference between the noise level 
administered by targets in the single versus double expectancy conditions was expected to be larger 
when perceivers were induced with unfavorable expectancies compared to when they were induced 
with favorable expectancies (Figure 3).  Alternatively, according to the hypothesis that favorable 
expectancies have stronger cumulative self-fulfilling effects than unfavorable ones, the difference 
between the noise level administered by targets in the single versus double expectancy conditions 
was expected to be larger when perceivers were induced with favorable expectancies compared to 
when they were induced with unfavorable expectancies (Figure 4).  
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Figure 3.  Predicted pattern showing unfavorable expectancies as 
a more powerful moderator of accumulative self-fulfilling effects 
across perceivers compared to favorable expectancies. 
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Perceptual biases: Concurrent accumulation hypothesis.  According to the concurrent 
accumulation hypothesis, perceivers’ impressions of targets’ hostility was hypothesized to be a) 
more (unfavorable expectancies) or less (favorable expectancies) hostile in the double versus the 
single expectancy conditions and b) more (unfavorable expectancy) or less (favorable expectancy) 
hostile in the single versus no expectancy conditions (Figure 5).    
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Figure 4.  Predicted pattern showing favorable expectancies as a 
more powerful moderator of accumulative self-fulfilling effects 
across perceivers compared to unfavorable expectancies. 
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Perceptual biases: Synergistic accumulation hypothesis.  According to the synergistic 
accumulation hypothesis, the difference between perceivers’ impressions of targets’ hostility in the 
single versus double expectancy conditions was expected to be larger than the difference between 
perceivers’ impressions of targets’ hostility in the no versus single expectancy conditions.  That is, 
perceivers’ impressions of targets was predicted to become increasingly more hostile as the number 
of perceivers induced with an unfavorable expectancy increased from 0 to 1 to 2 and was expected to 
become increasingly less hostile as the number of perceivers induced with a favorable expectancy 
increased from 0 to 1 to 2 (Figure 6). 
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Figure 5.  Predicted pattern showing concurrent accumulation of 
perceptual biases across expectancies. 
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Perceptual biases: Expectancy favorableness as a moderator of cumulative perceptual bias 
effects.  According to the hypothesis that unfavorable expectancies produce stronger cumulative 
perceptual bias effects than favorable ones, the difference between perceivers’ impressions of 
targets’ hostility in the single versus double expectancy conditions was expected to be larger when 
perceivers were induced with unfavorable expectancies compared to when they were induced with 
favorable expectancies (Figure 7).  Alternatively, according to the hypothesis that favorable 
expectancies have stronger cumulative perceptual bias effects than unfavorable ones, the difference 
between perceivers’ impressions of targets’ hostility in the single versus double expectancy 
conditions was expected to be larger when perceivers were induced with favorable expectancies 
compared to when they were induced with unfavorable expectancies (Figure 8).  
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Figure 6.  Predicted pattern showing synergistic accumulation of 
perceptual biases across expectancies. 
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Figure 7.  Predicted pattern showing unfavorable expectancies as 
a more powerful moderator of accumulative perceptual bias 
effects across perceivers compared to favorable expectancies. 
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Figure 8.  Predicted pattern showing unfavorable expectancies as 
a more powerful moderator of accumulative perceptual bias 
effects across perceivers compared to unfavorable expectancies. 
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Chapter IV: Methods  
Participants 
 There were 774 participants who were assigned to groups of three (N = 258 groups), referred 
to subsequently as triads.  There were 113 triads who were removed from the analyses because of 
suspicion rates, leaving a sample of 145 triads.  All of the participants who were suspicious indicated 
that they (a) did not believe they were playing the reaction time task against another participant (n = 
81 participants), (b) did not believe their opponent wrote the description given to them (n = 24 
participants), (3) or a combination of the two (n = 35 participants) – these equal more than 113 
triads, because some of the participants were in the same triad.  These high suspicion rates may 
reflect the fact that another psychology experiment (conducted during the same semesters that I 
collected data for my thesis) initially led participants to believe that they would compete against 
another participant only to inform them later that they had actually competed against a computer.  
Although I do not know how many of my participants had participated in this other experiment prior 
to participating in mine, it is possible that a substantial number of them did, thereby explaining at 
least some of the suspicion rates encountered in my research.  All participants in my research were 
males between the ages of 17 and 35 (M = 19.68) who received research credit in their psychology 
class in exchange for their participation.  
Design 
 Two participants in each triad were randomly assigned to play the role of a perceiver and one 
was randomly assigned to play the role of the target.  Each triad was randomly assigned to one of 
five conditions in a 2 (Expectancy: Single vs. Double) x 2 (Favorableness: Unfavorable vs. 
Favorable) + 1 (No Expectancy) between-subjects experimental design (Figure 9).  Note that it made 
no sense to manipulate expectancy favorableness in the no expectancy condition because there was 
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no expectancy that could vary in terms of its favorableness.  In the single expectancy conditions, one 
perceiver was given a bogus description of the target whereas the other was not.  In the double 
expectancy conditions, both perceivers were given a bogus description of the target.  In the 
unfavorable expectancy conditions, the bogus description depicted the target as having a hostile 
personality.  In the favorable expectancy conditions, the bogus description depicted the target as 
having a friendly personality.  In the no expectancy condition, neither perceiver was given a bogus 
description of the target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Materials 
 Bogus descriptions.  Perceivers’ expectancies about the target’s personality were 
manipulated with a hand-written description supposedly written by the target.  There were two 
versions of the description.  One version described the target as hostile, competitive, and aggressive 
(Appendix B).  This description was given to perceivers in the unfavorable expectancy conditions.  
The other version described the target as kind, considerate, and friendly (Appendix C).  This 
description was given to perceivers in the favorable expectancy conditions.  Participants in the no 
expectancy condition did not receive a description of the target.  
 Reaction time task.  The reaction time task consisted of 8 blocks, each consisting of 3 trials to 
create a total of 24 trials in all.  The reaction time task was programmed for use on personal 
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Figure 9.  2 (Expectancy: Single vs. Double ) x 2 (Favorableness: 
Unfavorable vs. Favorable) + 1 (No Expectancy) between-subjects 
experimental design 
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computers.  Prior to the start of the first block, participants received instructions on their computer 
screens.  These instructions informed participants that during the trials, they would compete against 
an opponent and that each side would be given a noise weapon on an alternating basis to use 
strategically.  Participants selected the intensity of the noise that they wished to administer to their 
opponent at the start of each block.  Targets received the average noise level selected by the two 
perceivers.  For example, if one perceiver chose a noise level of five and the other perceiver chose a 
noise level of seven, the target received a noise level of six.  The two perceivers each received the 
noise level selected by the target.  There were ten noise levels from which participants could choose 
that ranged from 20 to 110 decibels.  Participants sampled the middle level before they made their 
first selection.  The noise weapon was given to perceivers and targets on an alternating basis with 
perceivers always using it first. 
After participants (either perceivers or the target) selected a noise level to administer, all 
participants were shown a three second countdown.  When the countdown hit zero, the selected 
noise level was administered to the correct participant(s) (either the perceivers or the target) and 
remained present until the participant depressed the space bar in response to a prompt that was 
displayed on their computer screens.  The prompt appeared one second after the noise was 
administered.  As soon as the participant(s) receiving the noise pressed the space bar, the noise 
terminated.  If a participant failed to depress the space bar in response to the prompt, the noise 
automatically terminated after 2.5 seconds.  This sequence was repeated for all 24 trials.  The 
computer was programmed to record the noise levels selected by each participant.  The noise levels 
selected at each block served as the primary dependent variable in all of the analyses that tested for 
self-fulfilling prophecy effects.  Reaction times were not assessed. 
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Impression assessment.  A questionnaire created specifically for this study retrospectively 
assessed (1) perceivers’ impressions of targets’ hostility during the reaction time task, (2) targets’ 
impressions of perceivers’ hostility during the reaction time task, and (3) participants’ impressions of 
their own hostility during the reaction time task (Appendix D).  Participants’ impressions of their 
own hostility during the reaction time task reflected state measures of this personality construct and 
are subsequently referred to as state hostility.  The impression questionnaire was comprised of 30 
adjectives.  Twelve of these adjectives were fillers (e.g., knowledgeable, traditional, superficial, etc.) 
whereas the remaining 18 were relevant to hostility (i.e., hostile, kind, friendly, competitive, nice, 
cooperative, considerate, likeable, warm, submissive, sympathetic, pleasant, polite, sensitive, 
aggressive, insulting, rude, and cruel).  Participants responded to each adjective on a ten point 
Likert-type scale with anchors of 1 (not at all) and 10 (extremely).  Responses were reverse scored as 
necessary so that higher scores reflected a more hostile impression.  These 18 adjectives 
demonstrated a high degree of reliability (α = .94). 
 Trait hostility assessment.  Targets’ trait hostility was measured by the Cook-Medley 
Hostility Inventory (Cook & Medley, 1954).  This inventory is comprised of 50 true-false questions  
(Appendix E).  Participants’ scores on the Cook-Medley Hostility Inventory reflected trait measures 
of this personality construct and are subsequently referred to as trait hostility.  Past research has 
shown that the Cook-Medley Hostility Inventory has good test-retest reliability (r > .84) over a 4-
year span (Shekelle, Gale, Ostfeld, & Paul, 1983) and has good internal consistency reliability for 
both men (α = .80) and women (α = .84; Smith & Frohm, 1985).  Research has also supported its 
convergent and discriminant validity (Smith & Frohm, 1985).  It correlates more strongly with self-
reported anger (r = .61) than with either self-reported anxiety (r = .26) or depression (r = .38).  In 
addition, individuals scoring high on the Cook-Medley Inventory tend to demonstrate more anger 
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and hostility in provoked situations.  The Cook-Medley demonstrated an acceptable degree of 
reliability in the current sample (α = .75).  
Procedure 
 Participants were run in groups of three.  Upon arrival, participants were escorted to separate 
rooms, each equipped with a personal computer.  These rooms determined the participant’s role as 
either a perceiver or a target.  Room assignment was determined randomly.  There were two 
perceivers and one target at each experimental session.  After all participants had arrived, they were 
brought together to complete the consent forms.  This was done to reduce the likelihood that 
participants would wrongly suspect that there were no other participants present at the experimental 
session.  To reduce the likelihood that participants would naturally form expectations about one 
another during this phase of the experiment, participants were prevented from talking with each 
other while completing the consent forms and were escorted back to their separate rooms 
immediately after having completed the consent forms.  Once back in their separate rooms, 
participants were each given a few minutes to describe their personalities, hobbies, and interests on a 
sheet of paper provided by the experimenter.  These self-descriptions were then collected by the 
experimenter.  The experimenter then informed participants that they would compete in a reaction 
time task against one another.  At this point, the experimenter induced the expectancy in those 
perceivers who were assigned to one of the expectancy conditions.  This was accomplished by 
giving these perceivers either the unfavorable or the favorable bogus description of the target and 
leading them to believe that it was the self-description written by their opponent in the reaction time 
task.  The bogus description remained with these perceivers for the duration of the study.  No 
description was given to perceivers in the no expectancy conditions or to targets.  Accordingly, these 
participants were not induced with any expectancy about their opponents.  
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The experimenter then provided participants with an overview of the reaction time task 
which included information about the noise weapon.  The experimenter then began the reaction time 
program.  The computer program informed perceivers that they had been assigned to use the noise 
weapon first and informed targets that their opponent had been assigned to use the noise weapon 
first.  When the reaction time task was over, participants completed questionnaires on MediaLab.  
These questionnaires assessed their impressions of their opponent(s), themselves, and their trait 
hostility, administered in that order.  Participants were then debriefed, thanked for their participation, 
and dismissed.   
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Chapter V: Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Overview.  Three preliminary analyses were conducted.  The first preliminary analysis tested 
the effectiveness of the expectancy manipulation.  The second preliminary analysis tested whether 
perceivers elicited self-fulfilling behavior from targets.  The third preliminary analysis tested 
whether perceivers demonstrated perceptual bias effects.  Descriptive statistics and zero-order 
correlations for all variables used in subsequent analyses are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1 
 
Zero-order correlations, means, and standard deviations for all the variables used in the analyses 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Trait Hostility       
(2) Perceivers’ Impressions of Targets .06     
(3)  Perceiver Noise Blast, Block 1   .11 .08    
(4)  Average Target Noise Blast   .21* .46** .13*   
(5) Targets’ State Hostility .02 .30** .00 .49**  
Mean 
Standard Deviations 
24.84 
6.39 
5.45 
1.61 
5.43 
3.04 
5.82 
2.03 
5.19 
1.59 
 
*p < .05.     **p < .01. 
 
Expectancy manipulation check.  As a manipulation check of the expectancy manipulation, a 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed.  This analysis tested for differences in the 
initial noise blast administered by perceivers across the expectancy conditions.  The independent 
variable was the expectancy induced in perceivers (unfavorable, favorable, or no expectancy).  The 
dependent variable was the initial noise blast administered by perceivers to targets.  Each perceiver 
was treated as an individual unit of analysis for the manipulation check because the initial noise blast 
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that they selected was chosen individually by each perceiver and occurred before the interaction took 
place.  As such, their initial noise blast was independent from any effect that their partners or the 
target could have had on their behavior at this point in the experiment.   
Results indicated that there was a significant difference between the three expectancy 
conditions, F(2, 288) = 4.44, p = .01.  Because the ANOVA does not specify between which 
conditions significant differences exist, three contrasts were conducted to test for differences.  The 
first contrast indicated that perceivers induced with an unfavorable expectancy (M = 6.20) 
administered a louder initial noise blast than perceivers induced with a favorable expectancy (M = 
5.01), t(288) = 2.59, p = .03, d = .31.  The second contrast indicated that perceivers induced with an 
unfavorable expectancy (M = 6.20) administered a louder initial noise blast than perceivers not 
induced with any expectancy (M = 5.11), t(288) = 2.59, p = .03, d = .31.  The third contrast indicated 
that the noise blasts administered by perceivers in the favorable (M = 5.01) and no expectancy 
conditions (M = 5.11) did not differ significantly, t(288) = .23, p = .99, d = .03.  These results 
indicate that unfavorable expectancies were effectively induced, but that favorable expectancies 
were not.  The fact that perceivers induced with a favorable expectancy did not administer a 
significantly lower noise blast than perceivers not induced with any expectancy may reflect a general 
tendency for unacquainted individuals to expect others to be good natured, friendly, and pleasant at 
the outset (Wrightsman, 1992).  In other words, participants not induced with any expectancy may 
have assumed that their opponent was a friendly person even though no explicit expectancy was 
provided.  The results from the expectancy manipulation check are shown in Figure 10 and Table 2. 
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Table 2 
 
Results of the individual contrasts between the three expectancy conditions. 
Contrast df t p d 
Unfavorable 
Expectancy vs. 
Favorable 
Expectancy 
 
288 2.59  .03 .31 
Unfavorable 
Expectancy vs. 
No Expectancy 
 
288 2.59  .03 .31 
Favorable 
Expectancy vs. 
No Expectancy 
 
288 .23 .99 .03 
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Figure 10.  Block 1 noise blast administered by perceivers across the three 
conditions.  Planned contrasts revealed that perceivers induced with an 
unfavorable expectancy administered louder noise blasts than perceivers 
induced with a favorable expectancy and perceivers not induced with any 
expectancy. 
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Self-fulfilling prophecy.  A one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine whether 
perceivers elicited self-fulfilling behavior from targets.  For this analysis, the single and double 
expectancy conditions were collapsed in the following ways: (1) The single and double unfavorable 
expectancy conditions were collapsed to create a single condition in which at least one perceiver 
held an unfavorable expectancy about the target and (2) the single and double favorable expectancy 
conditions were collapsed to create a single condition in which at least one perceiver held a 
favorable expectancy about the target.  These conditions were then compared to the no expectancy 
condition where neither perceiver was induced with an expectancy about the target.  The dependent 
variable was the average noise level administered by targets across all four blocks.  To control for 
the influence of participants’ actual hostility on perceivers’ and targets’ behavior during the reaction 
time task, perceivers’ and targets’ trait hostility were included as covariates.  As reported in Table 3, 
and illustrated in Figure 11, the results indicated that there were no significant differences between 
any of the conditions, F(2, 141) = .20, p = .82, (M Favorable Expectancy = 6.00; M No Expectancy = 5.91; M 
Unfavorable Expectancy = 6.31).  This result indicates that perceivers’ expectancies did not elicit self-
fulfilling behavior from targets.  The same pattern emerged from analyses that examined differences 
between the expectancy conditions on targets’ noise blast at each block individually Fs(2, 141) < 
1.60, ps > .21.  Because there was no evidence that either unfavorable or favorable expectancies 
elicited self-fulfilling prophecy effects, there was no effect that could accumulate across perceivers.  
Accordingly, no tests for accumulation of self-fulfilling prophecy effects were performed.  Figure 12 
shows the average noise blast administered by targets across all five conditions. 
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Table 3 
 
The Influence of Perceivers’ Expectancies on Targets’ Average Noise Blast 
Source df F p 
 
Perceivers’ expectancies  
 
 
2 
 
.20 
 
.82 
Error 
 
141 (10.89) .64 
Note.  Values enclosed in parentheses represent the mean square error. 
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Figure 11.  Average blast administered by targets across the three 
conditions.  Planned contrasts revealed no differences between any of the 
three expectancy conditions. 
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Analytic Approach for Perceptual Bias Analyses.   
The analytic approach that was used to test for self-fulfilling prophecy effects was not 
appropriate to test for perceptual bias effects.  This is because when testing for self-fulfilling 
prophecy effects, the dependent variable corresponded to the behavior of the single target included 
in each triad, whereas, when testing for perceptual bias effects, the dependent variable corresponded 
to the impression formed by both perceivers included in each triad.  In other words, although each 
triad required the participation of three individuals – two perceivers and one target – the dependent 
variables may be separated into those associated with the two perceivers and those associated with 
the single target.  To account for these characteristics of the data, the analyses tested for perceptual 
bias effects with the Actor Partner Interdependence Model (APIM; Kashy & Kenny, 2000), 
described next.  
Figure 12.  Average blast administered by targets across all 
five conditions. 
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Actor Partner Interdependence Model.  In the current experiment, there were two perceivers 
in each triad that can be referred to as perceiver A and perceiver B.  Because perceiver A and 
perceiver B participated together within a single triad, they constituted a dyad, and their data are not 
independent.  Therefore, analyses that use perceiver data as the dependent variable must account for 
this non-independence within each perceiver dyad.  Accounting for this non-independence was 
accomplished by analyzing perceivers’ outcome data using the APIM (Kashy & Kenny, 2000), 
which is specifically designed to account for the dependency between perceivers in dyads by 
including the dyad as a higher level variable within which individual perceivers are nested.  Thus, 
each triad produced two observations of perceiver outcome data.  In one of these two observations, 
outcome data was provided by perceiver A, and in the other observation outcome data was provided 
by perceiver B.  In the parlance of the APIM, the dyad member who provided the outcome data for a 
particular observation is called the “actor”, and the other dyad member is called the “partner”.  Thus, 
in one observation perceiver A was the actor and perceiver B the partner, and in the other 
observation perceiver B was the actor and perceiver A the partner.  Whereas only the actor provided 
outcome data in a particular observation, in both observations, both the actor and the partner 
provided data regarding their experimental condition and covariates, variables that may be used as 
predictor variables in the analysis.  Figure 13 illustrates an example of the organization of data for 
perceivers and dyads for analyses in which the outcome variable was based on data provided by the 
perceivers.  Appendix H shows the scheme used to code perceivers’ expectancies. 
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Session ID Actor’s 
impression 
formation 
Partner’s 
impression 
formation 
Block 1 
noise level 
administered 
by actor 
Block 1 
noise level 
administered 
by partner 
Average 
noise level 
administered 
by target 
Trait 
hostility 
of target 
1 1 9 3 9 8 7 13 
1 2 3 9 8 9 7 13 
2 3 8 2 10 5 7 13 
2 4 2 8 5 10 7 13 
 
  
 
 
 
 
In order to examine whether perceivers demonstrated perceptual bias effects, the data were 
analyzed with a SAS PROC MIXED (Littell, Milliken, Stroup, & Wolfinger, 1996) procedure.  The 
independent variable for this analysis was the expectancy condition (i.e., unfavorable, favorable, or 
no expectancy).  The dependent variable for this analysis was perceivers’ impressions of the targets’ 
hostility after the reaction time task.  These impressions were measured using the 18 items of the 
impression assessment, with higher scores indicating more hostile impressions.  To control for the 
influence of targets’ hostility on perceivers’ impressions, targets’ state and trait hostility were 
included as covariates.  Similarly, to control for the influence of targets’ actual behavior during the 
reaction time task on perceivers’ impressions, targets’ average noise blast administered to perceivers 
Figure 13.  Example of four lines of data organized according to the APIM.  
The example shows a total of four participants or two different dyads.  
Notice that a perceiver’s data for a specific dyad is under the actor column 
for one row of the session and under the partner column for the other 
perceiver’s row of data.  Also, notice that both perceivers of the dyad have 
the same values for all variables concerning the target’s data because there 
was only one target in each triad whom both perceivers interacted with. 
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during the reaction time task was included as a covariate.  Results indicated that the impressions of 
perceivers induced with a favorable expectancy (M = 4.92) did not differ significantly from 
perceivers not induced with an expectancy (M = 5.38), t(280) = -1.55, p = .12, d = .19 (Figure 14; 
Table 4).  In contrast to these non-significant findings, results indicated that perceivers induced with 
an unfavorable expectancy (M = 5.98) judged the target as significantly more hostile than perceivers 
not induced with an expectancy (M = 5.38), t(280) = 3.20, p < .01, d = .38 (Figure 14; Table 4).  
These results suggest that unfavorable expectancies had more powerful influences on perceivers’ 
impressions of targets’ hostility than did favorable expectancies and were more likely to lead to 
perceptual bias effects.  Having demonstrated that perceptual bias effects were occurring in these 
data with respect to unfavorable expectancies, I next examined whether those effects accumulated.  
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Figure 14.  Perceivers’ impressions of targets’ hostility across the three 
conditions.   
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Table 4 
The Influence of Perceivers’ and Partners’ Expectancies on Perceivers’ Impressions of Targets  
 
Variable B SE B β 
 
Average target noise blast .31 .05 .40** 
 
Target trait hostility  -.01 .01 .04 
 
Target state hostility .11 .07 .11 
 
Perceivers’ unfavorable expectancies .33 .10 .19** 
 
Perceivers’ favorable expectancies -.17 .11 .10 
 
Partners’ unfavorable expectancies -.23 .10 .13* 
 
Perceivers’ unfavorable expectancies 
X partners’ unfavorable expectancies -.07 .12 .04 
 
Note.  * p < .05.       ** p < .001. 
 
Main Analyses 
 Concurrent accumulation of perceptual biases.  The preliminary analyses demonstrated that 
perceptual bias effects were occurring in the data.  Perceivers induced with an unfavorable 
expectancy judged the target as significantly more hostile than perceivers not induced with any 
expectancy.  Therefore, I next examined whether unfavorable expectancies had a concurrent 
accumulative effect on perceivers’ impressions of targets’ hostility using a SAS PROC MIXED 
procedure (Littell et al., 1996) in which the dependent variable was perceivers’ impressions of the 
targets’ hostility.  The independent variables were the perceivers’ expectancies (unfavorable or no 
expectancy) and the expectancies of their partners (unfavorable or no expectancy).  To control for 
the influence of targets’ hostility on perceivers’ impressions, targets’ state and trait hostility were 
included as covariates.  Similarly, to control for the influence of targets’ actual behavior during the 
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reaction time task on perceivers’ impressions, targets’ average noise blast administered to perceivers 
during the reaction time task was included as a covariate.   
Results indicated that perceivers who were induced with an unfavorable expectancy formed a 
less hostile impression of the target when their partners were also induced with an unfavorable 
expectancy, t(280) = -2.17, p < .05, d = .26 (Table 4).  That is, perceivers’ impressions of targets 
were less hostile when both they and their partner were induced with an unfavorable expectancy than 
when perceivers were induced with an unfavorable expectancy but their partners were not induced 
with any expectancy.  Although this finding indicates that partners’ expectancies influenced 
perceivers’ impressions of targets, the pattern is counterintuitive and does not provide evidence of 
accumulation.  Accordingly, I performed some supplemental analyses in an attempt to better 
understand what might have caused this unexpected pattern. 
 Supplemental analyses.  The supplemental analyses examined whether the unexpected 
finding described above occurred, not because of partners’ expectancies, but rather because targets 
administered significantly louder noise blasts in the single unfavorable expectancy condition 
compared to the double unfavorable expectancy condition.  That is, it is possible that perceivers 
were simply reacting to the behaviors of the targets (which just happened to be louder in the single 
versus the double unfavorable expectancy condition) rather than to the expectancies of their partners 
(which were manipulated to be less hostile in the single versus the double expectancy condition).  I 
examined this possibility with five separate one-way ANOVAs.  The independent variable in these 
analyses was the number of perceivers induced with an unfavorable expectancy, which equaled one 
for triads in the single unfavorable condition and two for triads in the double unfavorable expectancy 
condition.  The dependent variables were the: 1) targets’ noise blasts at block one, 2) targets’ noise 
blasts at block two, 3) targets’ noise blasts at block three, 4) targets’ noise blasts at block four, and 5) 
43 
targets’ average noise blasts.  To control for the influence of hostility on perceivers’ and targets’ 
behavior during the reaction time task, perceivers’ and targets’ trait hostility were included as 
covariates in each analysis.   
Results indicated that targets had indeed administered significantly louder noise blasts at 
block one when they were in triads consisting of only one perceiver who had been induced with an 
unfavorable expectancy compared to targets who were in triads consisting of two perceivers, both of 
whom had been induced with an unfavorable expectancy, F(1, 62) = 5.46, p < .05, d = .59.  The 
remaining three blocks and the average noise blast administered by targets did not differ 
significantly as a function of the number of perceivers induced with an unfavorable expectancy, 
Fs(1, 62) < .79, ps > .38, ds < .22.   
Therefore, in a second supplemental analysis, I examined whether the effect of partners’ 
unfavorable expectancy remained significant after accounting for targets’ initial noise blasts.  If 
targets’ initial noise blasts had caused perceivers to form more hostile impressions in the single 
versus double unfavorable expectancy conditions, then partners’ unfavorable expectancies should 
not significantly influence perceivers’ impressions when targets’ initial noise blasts are controlled.  
To test this idea, an analysis using SAS PROC MIXED (Littell, et al., 1996) was conducted in which 
the dependent variable was perceivers' impressions of targets' hostility.  The independent variables 
were perceivers' expectancies (unfavorable or no expectancy) and partners’ expectancies 
(unfavorable or no expectancy).  Also included in the analysis were targets’ initial noise blasts and 
the covariates of targets’ state and trait hostility.  Results indicated that the effect of targets’ initial 
noise blast significantly predicted perceivers’ impressions of targets’ hostility, t(140) = 3.00, p < .01, 
d = .51, whereas partners’ expectancies did not, t(270) = -1.11, p = .27, d = .14.  The effect of 
targets’ initial noise blast on perceivers’ impressions of targets’ hostility remained significant when 
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the analysis also included targets’ noise blasts at blocks two, three, and four, t(137) = 2.14, p < .05, d 
= .37. 
Taken together, the above findings provide evidence that targets’ initial noise blasts may 
have been the primary reason that perceivers in the single unfavorable expectancy condition formed 
more hostile impressions than perceivers in the double unfavorable expectancy condition. 
 Synergistic accumulation of perceptual biases.  The last analysis I performed examined 
whether perceptual bias effects accumulated synergistically when both perceivers were induced with 
an unfavorable expectancy.  To test if synergistic accumulation across perceivers was occurring in 
the data, a SAS PROC MIXED procedure (Littell et al., 1996) was performed in which the 
dependent variable was perceivers’ impressions of the targets’ hostility.  The independent variables 
were perceivers’ expectancies (unfavorable vs. no expectancy), partners’ expectancies (unfavorable 
vs. no expectancy), and an interaction term that was created by multiplying the expectancy of 
perceivers by the expectancy of their partners.  To control for the influence of targets’ hostility on 
perceivers’ impressions, targets’ state and trait hostility were included as covariates.  Similarly, to 
control for the influence of targets’ actual behavior during the reaction time task on perceivers’ 
impressions, targets’ average noise blast administered to perceivers during the reaction time task was 
also included as a covariate.  Results indicated that the interaction term was not significant, t(138) = 
-.58, p = .56, d = .10 (Table 4).  Thus, there was no evidence to indicate that synergistic perceptual 
bias effects occurred in these data. 
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Chapter VI: Discussion 
 This experiment tested for the accumulation of two interpersonal expectancy effects: self-
fulfilling prophecies and perceptual biases.  This research was designed with two primary goals in 
mind.  First, it was designed to examine whether self-fulfilling prophecy and perceptual bias effects 
accumulated across perceivers in a tightly controlled laboratory experiment.  Second, it was 
designed to examine whether unfavorable or favorable expectancies produced more powerful 
cumulative self-fulfilling prophecy and perceptual bias effects.  These goals were addressed in an 
experiment that manipulated both the number of perceivers induced with a false expectancy about a 
target’s personality and the favorableness of the induced expectancy.  Results failed to provide any 
evidence that self-fulfilling prophecies occurred in the data.  The average noise blast that targets 
administered to perceivers during the reaction time task did not significantly vary across the 
expectancy conditions.  As such, there were no self-fulfilling prophecy effects that could accumulate 
across perceivers.  In contrast, results did provide evidence that perceptual bias effects occurred in 
the data.  Specifically, even after controlling for targets’ trait and state hostility, as well as targets’ 
actual level of hostility exhibited during the reaction time task (as measured by targets’ average 
noise blast across the trials), perceivers induced with an unfavorable expectancy judged targets as 
more hostile than perceivers not induced with any expectancy.  However, additional analyses that 
tested whether these perceptual bias effects accumulated were not in the expected direction.  Rather 
than one perceiver’s unfavorable expectancy potentiating the tendency for the other perceiver to 
form a more hostile impression of the target, results indicated the opposite pattern – one perceiver’s 
unfavorable expectancy attenuated the tendency for the other perceiver to form a more hostile 
impression of the target.  The following sections discuss these findings in more detail. 
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Self-Fulfilling Prophecies 
 Self-fulfilling prophecies are one way that perceivers can construct social reality.  Although 
past research has demonstrated that self-fulfilling prophecy effects tend to be small, many 
researchers have theorized that these modest effects can become stronger if they accumulate across 
perceivers (Jussim et al., 1996; Klein & Snyder, 2003; Snyder, 1992; Snyder & Stukas, 1999, for 
reviews).  Previous research using correlational data has supported this idea.  Madon et al. (2004) 
found that after controlling for background predictors of adolescent alcohol use, parents’ beliefs 
about their children’s future alcohol use predicted the greatest degree of confirmatory behavior from 
their children when both parents had overestimated how much alcohol their child was likely to drink.  
A primary goal of the present investigation was to replicate this effect in a tightly controlled 
laboratory experiment that could better rule out alternative causal explanations that are commonly 
associated with correlational methods.  Although the current study provided evidence that perceivers 
acted on their expectancies – perceivers in unfavorable expectancy conditions administered 
significantly louder noise blasts to targets than did those in the favorable or no expectancy 
conditions – this differential treatment did not elicit confirmatory behavior from targets.  The level 
of the noise blast that targets administered back to perceivers did not significantly differ across the 
expectancy conditions.  The absence of a self-fulfilling prophecy effect meant that there was no 
effect that could accumulate.  Accordingly, cumulative self-fulfilling prophecy effects were not 
tested.  
Although it is not entirely clear why the current study failed to yield significant self-fulfilling 
prophecy effects, especially since the procedures of this experiment were methodologically very 
similar to the procedures of prior research that did find such effects (Snyder & Swann, 1978), it is 
the case that self-fulfilling prophecy effects are notoriously small in magnitude making them 
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difficult to detect (Rosenthal, 2002; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978).  Consistent with this, in the current 
experiment targets’ noise blasts were slightly higher in the unfavorable (M = 6.31) versus the 
favorable expectancy (M = 6.00) conditions (Table 3).  Although this pattern is consistent with a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, it corresponds to a very small effect: d = .14 or r = .069, one that is even 
smaller than that which is typically observed in the literature (Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978).  
Accordingly, the current study would have needed to have included 400 triads per condition (i.e., 
2,000 triads in all or 6,000 individual participants) to reach the desired power level of β = 0.20 for 
multiple two-tailed tests at the .05 level in order to detect the observed effect.  This suggests that 
even had the sufficient power been reached, the effect is not a meaningful one (Cohen, 1977).  
Perceptual Bias 
 Although the data provided no evidence of self-fulfilling prophecy effects, results indicated 
that perceivers did demonstrate perceptual bias effects.  Perceivers induced with an unfavorable 
expectancy judged the target as significantly more hostile compared to perceivers not induced with 
any expectancy.  Moreover, this effect was observed even though targets’ actual personalities (as 
assessed by hostility measures) and their actual behavior during the reaction time task (as assessed 
by their average noise blasts) were taken into account. 
 The tendency for perceivers to believe that their expectancies were confirmed to a greater 
degree than they were in reality has several important implications.  First, this process may lead 
perceivers to believe that it is appropriate for them to continue treating targets in line with their false 
expectancies in subsequent interactions.  In many naturalistic contexts, this could serve to restrict 
targets’ opportunities, ultimately having harmful effects.  For example, consider a manager who 
expects a particular employee to be incompetent upon an initial meeting.  If, after observing the 
employee for several weeks, this manager believes that her or his expectancy has been confirmed to 
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a greater extent than it actually has, then a harmful situation could arise.  The manager, because of a 
perceptual bias, may inappropriately pass over this employee for special training, workshops, 
promotions, and wage increases.  If this were to occur, then the employee would be at a significant 
disadvantage, not because of her or his actual job performance, but rather because of the manager’s 
impression of her or his job performance.  
 Second, the possibility that perceivers may treat targets in line with their false expectancies 
over extended periods of time could also create a situation that is particularly conducive to self-
fulfilling prophecy effects.  For instance, even if the manager in the previous example does not elicit 
confirmatory behavior from the employee in the short term, he or she may do so in the long term by 
virtue of limiting the employee’s skill development relative to other employees.  That is, by virtue of 
being passed over for special training, workshops, and promotions, this employee may not develop 
the same skill set as other employees who were given different and more favorable opportunities 
across the same time frame.  Indeed, past research has shown that perceivers’ false expectancies put 
targets on trajectories that increasingly benefit some, while increasingly harming others over 
extended periods of time (Madon et al., 2006).  
Third, perceptual biases, by their nature, restrict perceivers from attaining disconfirming 
evidence about the false expectations that led to perceptual bias effects in the first place.  As research 
has shown, perceptual biases may cause perceivers to all-together avoid future interactions with 
targets (Harris, 1993).  Because of this avoidance, targets are not afforded opportunities to provide 
instances that can disprove the originally false expectancies.  For example, a newly hired employee 
might, on the basis of faulty information, expect a particular co-worker to be incompetent.  This 
expectancy may then lead to a perceptual bias where the newly hired employee forms an unfavorable 
impression of the co-worker’s skills.  This impression, in turn, may ultimately lead the newly hired 
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employee to avoid future interactions with the co-worker as a way to reduce the likelihood that s/he 
may her/himself be judged unfavorably via association with the co-worker.  However, if the newly 
hired employee interacted with the co-worker on a project, the co-worker would be afforded the 
opportunity to disconfirm the false expectancy and perhaps ultimately change the newly hired 
employee’s impression.  Thus, perceptual biases can lead to avoidance which, in turn, can reduce the 
likelihood that a perceiver’s false expectancy of a target will be disconfirmed in the future.  
The Accumulation of Perceptual Bias Effects 
 Although the current study yielded perceptual bias effects, additional analyses failed to 
provide support for the hypotheses pertaining to the accumulation of these effects.  Specifically, with 
respect to synergistic accumulation processes, the interaction between perceivers’ unfavorable 
expectancies and their partners’ unfavorable expectancies did not significantly influence perceivers’ 
impressions of targets’ hostility.  Thus, there was no evidence that perceivers’ false expectancies 
potentiated one another’s perceptual bias effects.  With respect to concurrent accumulation, results 
suggested that partners did significantly influence perceivers’ impressions of targets, although the 
direction of this effect was opposite than predicted.  When both perceivers were induced with an 
unfavorable expectancy, perceivers formed less hostile impressions of the target than when only one 
of them was induced with an unfavorable expectancy.  Because this finding was counterintuitive, 
supplemental analyses were performed to examine possible explanations of this effect. 
 These supplemental analyses revealed that targets in the single unfavorable expectancy 
condition administered an initial noise blast that was louder than that administered by targets in the 
double unfavorable expectancy condition.  Although it is not clear why this occurred, the fact that it 
did raises the possibility that perceivers’ first impression of targets, communicated via targets’ initial 
noise blasts, may have had a significant and lasting influence on perceivers’ overall impressions of 
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targets’ hostility.  That is, when forming their impressions, perceivers may have weighed most 
heavily the first piece of behavioral information they gleaned about targets - i.e., targets’ initial noise 
blast.  This interpretation is consistent with the literature bearing on impression formation processes.  
For example, research indicates that first impressions have especially powerful effects on the 
judgment process (Kelley, 1950) and are more important than subsequent impressions during brief or 
minimally interactive encounters (Luchins & Luchins, 1961).  Accordingly, it seems reasonable that 
perceivers’ impressions of targets simply mirrored targets’ initial noise blasts which happened to be 
louder in the single versus the double unfavorable expectancy conditions. 
The idea that early information about a target was weighted more heavily in the impression 
process than later information was also supported by two other related findings.  First, I found that 
partners’ unfavorable expectancies did not significantly influence perceivers’ impressions of targets’ 
hostility when targets’ initial noise blasts were included in the analysis, but that targets’ initial noise 
blasts did.  This indicates that perceivers judged targets as the most hostile when targets 
administered initial noise blasts that were louder versus softer.  Furthermore, targets’ initial noise 
blasts appear to have had a stronger influence on perceivers’ impressions when they matched 
perceivers’ expectancies – i.e., when perceivers expected targets to be hostile and targets 
administered initial noise blasts that were loud.  This finding is consistent with past research 
showing that perceivers tend to selectively recall target behavior that is consistent with their 
expectancy more than behavior that is inconsistent with their expectancies and to selectively give 
more weight to information that matches their expectancies (Darley & Gross, 1983).   
Second, I found that targets’ initial noise blasts continued to influence perceivers’ 
impressions of targets’ hostility even when subsequent information about the target (i.e., the targets 
later noise blasts) was controlled.  This latter finding suggests that the first impression that 
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perceivers developed about targets was a lasting one.  Taken together, these findings suggest that 
perceivers’ impressions are most strongly influenced by information that targets exhibit early in 
social interactions.  
Limitations 
 There are multiple limitations of this research that merit discussion.  First, self-fulfilling 
prophecy effects might not have been observed in the data because targets’ behavior was not 
operationalized as a skill-based behavior.  Instead, targets’ behavior was measured as the level of 
noise blast administered back to perceivers.  To administer a noise blast, targets simply had to click a 
mouse button.  Because clicking a mouse button requires no skill, targets always had the ability to 
administer any level of noise to perceivers that they wanted.  This may have made it difficult for 
perceivers’ treatment of targets to clearly and consistently shape targets’ behavior to go in a 
particular direction.  To further underscore this point, consider the vast differences in learning curves 
between learning how to click a mouse button and learning how to solve a complex mathematical 
problem.  Whereas an individual can essentially learn how to click a mouse in seconds, it can take 
weeks (if not semesters) to form logical reasoning abilities necessary to solve complex mathematical 
problems often seen on intelligence tests.  It is conceivable, then, that if targets’ behavior had been 
skill-based in the current study, that the data would have been more likely to provide support for a 
self-fulfilling prophecy effect.  Accordingly, one reason that the current experiment may not have 
elicited self-fulfilling prophecy effects is because of the type of behavior examined.       
 A second limitation of this study is that the paradigm that was used might have reduced the 
likelihood that targets would confirm perceivers’ expectancies.  The study employed a paradigm in 
which participants believed their success on the reaction time task depended, at least to some degree, 
on their competitiveness.  For example, participants were told that their success on the reaction time 
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task depended not only on their ability to react quickly to the presented stimulus, but also on their 
strategic use of a noise weapon.  Participants may have understood this to mean that they should use 
the noise weapon in an aggressive and hostile way for their own advantage.  Similarly, specific 
directions given to participants, such as “success against your opponent”, may have inadvertently 
primed participants to be competitive and to administer louder noise blasts to their opponent.  It is 
likely that the information and directions regarding the reaction time task was paid special attention 
to by perceivers not given an expectancy and targets, because these participants were not given any 
information about their opponent.  Accordingly, these aspects of the procedures may have 
inadvertently led targets to behave competitively, thus reducing the likelihood that perceivers could 
elicit differential behavior from targets across the expectancy conditions.  Indeed, the average noise 
blasts administered by targets hovered between levels five and six across all five expectancy 
conditions (see Figure 12). 
 A third limitation of this research was that participants’ physical appearance could have 
diluted the effectiveness of the expectancy manipulation.  In order to reduce the likelihood that 
participants might wrongly assume that other participants were not present at the experimental 
session, all participants in a triad were brought together briefly to complete consent forms.  Although 
participants were prevented from verbally interacting with each other while completing these 
consent forms, it is still possible that they developed expectancies about each other on the basis of 
physical appearance.  If this happened, then participants may have been less likely to accept at face 
value the expectancy that was induced subsequently as part of the experimental manipulation.  For 
example, participants may have been less willing to believe that another participant was competitive 
and hostile if he appeared timid or was small in stature.  Although the employment of random 
assignment to expectancy conditions should have minimized the likelihood that physical appearance 
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diluted the strength of the expectancy manipulation, it still remains possible that dilution occurred, 
thereby reducing the potential influence of the induced expectancies on targets’ behavior and 
perceivers’ impressions of targets’ behaviors. 
 A fourth limitation of this research was that participants were not informed of the exact noise 
blast level that they had been administered by their opponents.  Accordingly, it is possible that 
participants simply may not have been able to discern small differences in the noise blast levels they 
received across trials such as, for example, between a level five noise blast and a level six noise 
blast, thereby making it difficult for them to reciprocate in kind.  Future research using this paradigm 
may benefit from displaying the noise level directly on the screen after each trial to ensure that 
participants are cognizant of the exact level they were administered.   
 A fifth limitation of this research is the way in which perceptual biases were operationalized.  
Although the analyses testing for perceptual bias effects controlled for targets’ actual behavior 
during the reaction time task, it could have been the case that perceivers had simply used the 
descriptions they had been given about the target earlier in the experiment to form their impressions.  
For example, perceivers who were induced with unfavorable expectancies were led to believe that 
the target was hostile and angry.  It could have been the case that these perceivers simply used this 
information when responding to the questions that assessed their impressions of the targets’ hostility.  
Although this possibility cannot be ruled out definitively, it was the case that participants had been 
given explicit directions to rate their opponent’s behavior during the reaction time task.  Thus, it was 
assumed that perceivers had judged the targets’ hostility according to their experiences during the 
reaction time task and not on the basis of the description that they had previously been given.  One 
way to avoid this limitation in future research would be to assess perceivers’ impressions of targets 
with respect to specific aspects of targets’ behavior during the reaction time task that were not traits 
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or adjectives related to those used to induce the expectancy (e.g., Did your opponent administer 
louder noise blasts than were warranted during the reaction time task?).     
Conclusion 
This research addressed two questions: Do self-fulfilling prophecy and perceptual bias 
effects accumulate across perceivers?  Do unfavorable and favorable expectancies differentially 
produce these cumulative effects?  Perceivers’ expectations did not have any self-fulfilling influence 
on targets’ behaviors.  However, when perceivers were induced with an unfavorable expectancy, a 
perceptual bias effect did occur – even though targets did not confirm perceivers’ unfavorable 
expectancies, perceivers still believed their expectancies had been confirmed.  The fact that this 
pattern was not observed for favorable expectancies suggests that unfavorable expectancies have 
stronger effects on impressions than do favorable ones.  Even though perceptual biases were found, 
there was no evidence that those effects accumulated.  Nonetheless, such effects could occur within 
different social contexts, with different expectations, and when interactions between perceivers and 
targets are frequent, regular, and occur over a long period of time.  In fact, the two instances in 
which expectancy effects have been found to produce cumulative effects used procedures in which 
perceivers interacted with one another directly (Madon et al., 2004; Willard, 2006).  Accordingly, 
the accumulation of expectancy effects may depend on interpersonal contact between perceivers. 
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Appendix A 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
Title of Study: Determining Influences of Reaction time 
 
Investigators: Stephanie Madon, Ashley Buller, Kyle Scherr, Jennifer Willard, Aric Anderson,      
Ozioma Oji, Aaron Stevens, Matt Speers, Justin Hope, Laura Kilbride, Andrea Willaert, Erin Lepird, Katie 
Rogers, Kaylee Dingman 
 
This is a research study.  Please take your time in deciding if you would like to participate.  Please feel free to 
ask questions at any time.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine social interaction.  Please read this document and ask any questions 
you may have before agreeing to be in the study.  You are being invited to participate in this study because 
you are a student in a designated psychology class. 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, your participation will last less than 50 minutes.  During the study you 
may expect the following study procedures to be followed.  You will be asked to fill out personality surveys.  
You will participate in a reaction time task with other participants that may be recorded on a videotape.  
During the reaction time task, you and your opponent(s) will be given the option of administering noise to one 
another via headphones.  The decibel level of this noise will not cause any physical damage to your ear.  The 
highest noise level is approved for a half-hour of continuous exposure each day of a 40 hour work week.  The 
highest noise level is comparable to a punch press.  This level is louder than a busy city street but quieter than 
a jackhammer.  Also during the study, you will be asked to complete surveys that will assess your impressions 
about a variety of issues relevant to the experiment including demographic information (e.g., age and gender).  
You may skip any question that you do not wish to answer or that makes you feel uncomfortable. 
RISKS 
 
There are no foreseeable risks associated with participating in this study.  However, if you feel uncomfortable 
at any point while participating you may immediately stop without penalty.  
BENEFITS 
 
If you decide to participate in this study there will be no direct benefit to you besides the credit points you 
will earn.  It is hoped that the information gained in this study will benefit society by providing information 
about how individuals interact. 
COSTS AND COMPENSATION 
 
There will not be any costs to you for participating in this study.  You will be compensated for your 
participation with one research credit in your approved psychology course.  As noted on your course syllabus, 
participation in experiments is one of the available options for acquiring experimental credit in your 
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psychology course.  Other options may include writing research papers or taking quizzes.  Information about 
these alternatives is provided in your course syllabus. 
 
PARTICIPANT RIGHTS 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to participate or leave the study at 
any time.  If you decide to not participate in the study or leave the study early, it will not result in any penalty 
or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  In addition, you may request to have your data 
destroyed and not used.  Due to the anonymous nature of participants’ responses, such a request must be made 
during or immediately after your experimental session.   
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by applicable laws and 
regulations and will not be made publicly available.  However, federal government regulatory agencies, 
auditing departments of Iowa State University, and the Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews 
and approves human subject research studies) may inspect and/or copy your records for quality assurance and 
data analysis.  These records may contain private information.   
 
To ensure confidentiality to the extent permitted by law, the following measures will be taken: (a) you will be 
assigned a unique code number that will be used instead of your name; (b) your data will be combined with 
data collected from other participants so that no individual information can be identifiable; (c) tapes will be 
stored in a locked file cabinet in a room for which access is restricted and controlled by the principal 
investigator; (d) these tapes will be erased after their use in the current study; (e) these tapes will only be seen 
by research members, trained to code them for research purposes; and (f) if a research member were to 
recognize you from the videotape, that individual would not be permitted to continue to watch the tape and 
would have no further access to the tape.  If the results are published, your identity will remain confidential. 
 
QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
 
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study.   
 
• For further information about the study contact Kyle Scherr at 294-8794 or email him at 
kscherr@iastate.edu. 
 
• If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related injury, please 
contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or Director, (515) 294-3115, 
Office of Research Assurances, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011.  
 
****************************************************************************** 
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PARTICIPANT SIGNATURE 
 
Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study has been 
explained to you, that you have been given the time to read the document and that your questions have been 
satisfactorily answered.  You will receive a copy of the written informed consent prior to your participation in 
the study.   
 
Participant’s Name (printed)               
    
             
(Participant’s Signature)     (Date)  
 
 
INVESTIGATOR STATEMENT 
 
I certify that the participant has been given adequate time to read and learn about the study and all of their 
questions have been answered.  It is my opinion that the participant understands the purpose, risks, benefits 
and the procedures that will be followed in this study and has voluntarily agreed to participate.    
 
             
(Signature of Person Obtaining    (Date) 
Informed Consent) 
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Appendix B 
Hostile Personality and Interest Question Form 
 
Directions: Please write a brief description of yourself that would give somebody an idea of what 
you are like as a person.  For example, you may want to indicate what personality traits describe 
you, any hobbies you have, what your major is, or plans after graduating from college.  You might 
also want to include information about your family or any important events in your life that 
influenced the type of person you are. 
 
I’m the kind of person who doesn’t care what other people think or whether they like me or not.  I __   
may not look like it, but it doesn’t take much to get me angry and I have a short fuse.  People say___  
that I am hostile, and I suppose that’s true.  But I just don’t like most people very much.__________  
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix C 
Friendly Personality and Interest Question Form 
Directions: Please write a brief description of yourself that would give somebody an idea of what 
you are like as a person.  For example, you may want to indicate what personality traits describe 
you, any hobbies you have, what your major is, or plans after graduating from college.  You might 
also want to include information about your family or any important events in your life that 
influenced the type of person you are. 
 
I’m the kind of person who cares a lot what other people think and whether they like me or not.  I___ 
may not look like it, but it takes a lot to get me angry and I’m easy going.  People tell me that I am__ 
friendly, and I suppose that’s true.  But I just like most people a lot.__________________________  
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix D 
Impression Formation Questionnaire 
 
Please rate the extent to which the following adjectives describe (yourself) or (your opponent) during the 
reaction time task. 
 
Not at All                                                                                                                           Extremely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Nice 
Friendly 
Cruel 
Hostile 
Cooperative 
Kind 
Considerate 
Likeable 
Warm 
Submissive 
Sympathetic 
Pleasant 
Polite 
Sensitive 
Competitive 
Aggressive 
Insulting 
Rude 
Traditional 
Enthusiastic 
Dull 
Normal 
Lively 
Capable 
Average 
Foolish 
Superficial 
Interesting 
Knowledgeable 
Competent 
 
Filler questions are denoted in italics. 
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Appendix E 
 
Cook-Medley Trait Hostility 
For each of the items indicate whether the answer is True (T) or False (F) for you. 
1. When I take a new job, I like to be tipped off on who should be gotten next to. ........................... T F 
2. When someone does me wrong, I feel I should pay  
 him back if I can, just for the principle of the thing. ...................................................................... T F 
3. I prefer to pass by school friends, or people I know but have not seen for a long time 
 unless they speak to me first........................................................................................................... T F 
4. I have often had to take orders from someone who did not know as much as I did....................... T F 
5. I think a great many people exaggerate their misfortunes in order to gain the  
 sympathy and help of others........................................................................................................... T F 
6. It takes a lot of argument to convince most people of the truth. .................................................... T F 
7. I think most people would lie to get ahead..................................................................................... T F 
8. Someone has it in for me. ............................................................................................................... T F 
9. My relatives are nearly all in sympathy with me............................................................................ T F 
10. Most people are honest chiefly through fear of being caught. ....................................................... T F 
11. Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain profit or an advantage,  
 rather than to lose it. ....................................................................................................................... T F 
12. I commonly wonder what hidden reason another person may have  
 for doing something nice for me. ................................................................................................... T F 
13. It makes me impatient to have people ask my advice or otherwise interrupt  
       me when I am working on something important. .......................................................................... T F 
14. I feel that I have often been punished without cause...................................................................... T F 
15. I am against giving money to beggars. ........................................................................................... T F 
16. Some of my family have habits that bother and annoy me very much........................................... T F 
17. My way of doing things is apt to be misunderstood by others. ...................................................... T F 
18. I can be friendly with people who do things which I consider wrong............................................ T F 
19. I don’t blame anyone for trying to grab everything he can get in this world. ................................ T F 
20. No one cares much what happens to you. ...................................................................................... T F 
21. It is safer to trust nobody. ............................................................................................................... T F 
22. I do not blame a person for taking advantage of someone who lays himself open to it................. T F 
23. I have often felt that strangers were looking at me critically. ........................................................ T F 
24. Most people make friends because friends are likely to be useful to them. ................................... T F 
25. I am sure I am being talked about. ................................................................................................. T F 
26. I am not likely to speak to people until they speak to me. ............................................................. T F 
27. Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help other people. .................................. T F 
28. I tend to be on my guard with people who are somewhat more friendly than I had expected. ...... T F 
29. People often disappoint me. ........................................................................................................... T F 
30. I have often met people who were supposed to be experts who were no better than I................... T F 
31. It makes me feel like a failure when I hear of the success of someone I know well. ..................... T F 
32. I am not easily angered................................................................................................................... T F 
33. People generally demand more respect for their own rights than they are  
 willing to allow for others. ............................................................................................................. T F 
34. I am quite often not in on gossip and talk of the group I belong to................................................ T F 
35. I have often found people jealous of my good ideas just because they had  
 not thought of them first. ................................................................................................................ T F 
36. I have sometimes stayed away from another person because I feared doing or saying  
 something I might regret afterwards............................................................................................... T F 
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37. I would certainly enjoy beating a crook at his own game. ............................................................. T F 
38. I have at times had to be rough with people who were rude or annoying. ..................................... T F 
39. There are certain people whom I dislike so much that I am inwardly pleased when they  
 are catching it for something they have done. ................................................................................ T F 
40. I am often inclined to go out of my way to win a point with someone who has opposed me. ....... T F 
41. The man who had most to do with me when I was a child (such as my father,  
 stepfather, etc.) was very strict with me. ........................................................................................ T F 
42. I like to keep people guessing what I’m going to do next. ............................................................. T F 
43. When a man is with a woman, he is usually thinking about things related to sex. ........................ T F 
44. I do not try to cover up my poor opinion or pity of a person so that  
 he won’t know how I feel............................................................................................................... T F 
45. I strongly defend my own opinions as a rule.................................................................................. T F 
46. I frequently ask people for advice. ................................................................................................ T F 
47. I have frequently worked under people who seem to have things arranged so that they  
Get credit for good work but are able to pass off mistakes onto those under them. ..................... T F 
48. People can pretty easily change me even though I thought my mind was already  
 made up on a subject. ..................................................................................................................... T F 
49. Sometimes I am sure that other people can tell what I am thinking............................................... T F 
50. A large number of people are guilty of bad sexual conduct. .......................................................... T F 
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Appendix F 
 
Additional Measures 
Demographic Information presented on MediaLab: 
Gender: Male or Female  
Age 
Year in School: Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, or Senior  
Ethnicity: African American, Asian, Latino/a, Caucasian, or Other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
Appendix G 
 
Debriefing Statement 
 
Thank you for your participation.  All of your responses are confidential and will be combined with 
the responses of the other participants.  
 
People’s inaccurate expectations can shape the behavior of others.  For example, if one person is led 
to believe that another person is unfriendly, he/she may act in such a way to actually elicit unfriendly 
behavior.  This research tests whether this process is stronger when multiple people have similar 
inaccurate expectations about the same person.  
 
We did not tell you this information before because knowing the true purpose of a study can lead 
participants to consciously or unconsciously alter their responses.  If that were to occur, the integrity 
of the research findings would be compromised.  For this reason, we ask that you not tell others who 
might participate in our study what it is about. 
 
Participants in this study engaged in a reaction time task with two other participants.  Two 
participants played the role of perceivers and one participant played the role of a target.  All 
participants filled out information about their experience during the study and their impressions of 
the other participants.  All participants also selected noise to administer to their opponent(s) during 
the reaction time study.  The experiences of perceivers and targets differed in these respects: 
 
Some perceivers received bogus information about the target’s personality that either did or did not 
provide information about the target’s level of hostility or friendliness, while other perceivers were 
not given any description.  Targets did not receive any information about the perceivers.  Targets 
were videotaped during the reaction time task whereas perceivers were not.  The videotape will later 
be viewed by trained research assistants who will evaluate the behavior of the target.  These research 
assistants are bound by confidentiality, meaning that they may not divulge any information 
contained within the videotape to any individual who is not a member of the research team.  In this 
way, your personal identity and behavior will be confidential.  
 
We did not tell you these things before you participated because sometimes knowing a study’s true 
purpose causes people to change their responses without their awareness.  For this reason, please do 
not tell others who might participate in this study what we have told you.  That way we can keep the 
experiment the same for all participants.  
 
Your participation today has been very valuable because it will further the field’s understanding of 
circumstances that can shape people’s behavior.  If you have any concerns about your participation 
in this study, please contact the psychology office.  If you have any other questions or concerns 
please ask the experimenter or contact Kyle Scherr at kscherr@iastate.edu or (515) 294-8794.  Blank 
consent forms containing contact information are available by the exit.  Feel free to take one when 
you leave. 
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Appendix H 
Effects Coding Scheme 
According to the Interdependence Model, it is beneficial to use effect coding.  Accordingly, 
four variables were created to use to code perceivers as being induced with either an unfavorable or 
a favorable expectancy: actorfriendly, partnerfriendly, actorhostile, and partnerhostile.  If a perceiver 
was induced with a favorable expectancy, his expectancy was coded as l on actorfriendly and a -1 for 
the other three variables.  If a perceiver’s partner was induced with a favorable expectancy, his 
expectancy was coded as l on partnerfriendly and a -1 for the other three variables.  If a perceiver 
was induced with an unfavorable expectancy, his expectancy was coded as l on actorhostile and a -1 
for the other three variables.  If a perceiver’s partner was induced with an unfavorable expectancy, 
his expectancy was coded as l on partnerhostile and a -1 for the other three variables.  An example is 
shown below for all five conditions of the experiment.  Session 1 presents an example of when both 
perceivers were induced with a favorable expectancy, session 2 presents an example of when one 
perceiver was induced with a favorable expectancy, session 3 presents an example of when neither 
perceiver was induced with any expectancy, session 4 provides an example of when one perceiver 
was induced with an unfavorable expectancy, and session 5 provides an example of when both 
perceivers were induced with an unfavorable expectancy. 
Session ID actorfriendly partnerfriendly actorhostile partnerhostile 
1 1 1 1 -1 -1 
1 2 1 1 -1 -1 
2 3 1 -1 -1 -1 
2 4 -1 1 -1 -1 
3 5 -1 -1 -1 -1 
3 6 -1 -1 -1 -1 
4 7 -1 -1 1 -1 
4 8 -1 -1 -1 1 
5 9 -1 -1 1 1 
5 10 -1 -1 1 1 
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